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The First Amendment Right of Silence 
 
 
Robert A. Sedler 
 
Abstract:  The Humanities Center of Wayne State University presented its Fall 
Symposium with the theme, Silence and Silencing. At this symposium, Professor Sedler 
presented a paper on "The First Amendment Right of Silence". The thesis of the paper is 
that in a number of respects, the First Amendment recognizes that the values embodied in 
the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and freedom of association mandate a 
right of silence. Thus, in answer to the question raised at the symposium, What does the 
law have to say about silence, the author says that in a number of contexts, the law of the 
First Amendment protects the right of silence. In the paper, the author discusses five 
contexts in which the First Amendment protects the right of silence. 
 
(1) The right to refuse to disclose one's beliefs and associations to the government. The 
Supreme Court has made it clear that persons are entitled to refuse to answer questions 
about their organizational membership and about their beliefs and associations unless the 
government could demonstrate a compelling interest in obtaining that information, which 
the government cannot do. Thus, in the face of the government's demands that a person 
disclose one's beliefs and associations, the person can reply, I choose to be silent. 
 
(2) The right to speak anonymously without disclosing one's identity. This right is an 
admixture of the right to speak and the right of silence. The speaker speaks the message, 
but is entitled to shield the speaker's identity while speaking the message. The right to 
speak anonymously advances the core purposes of the First Amendment, since it ensures 
that people will not be deterred from speaking for fear of reprisal by the government or 
by other people. 
 
(3) The right not to be compelled to speak the government's message. 
 
This aspect of the right of silence protects the right of schoolchildren to refuse to pledge 
allegiance to the flag, and the right of government employees to refuse to take an oath 
disavowing particular beliefs and associations. 
 
(4) The right not to be associated with particular ideas. 
 
The guarantee of freedom of speech means that a person is entitled to speak his or her 
own ideas and cannot forced to be associated with a particular idea with which that 
person disagrees. The right not to be associated with particular ideas arises in two 
situations. First, since money is considered speech for First Amendment purposes, the 
government cannot compel a person to pay money to support the expression of an idea 
with which that person disagrees. For example, when governmental employees are 
represented by a union under an agency shop arrangement fee, the union may not use any 
portion of the agency fee to advance ideological purposes unrelated to the union's 
function as collective bargaining representative. 
 
Second, there is the right not to be compelled to share one's own speech with opposing 
speech and to in effect provide a forum for that opposing speech. For example, the Court 
has held as unconstitutional a state right of reply law, which required a newspaper to give 
a right of reply in the newspaper to a political candidate that it had attacked in print. The 
effect of the law would be to force the newspaper to provide a forum for the political 
candidate to reply to the newspaper's attack on the candidate. 
 
(5) The right to avoid unwanted communications. 
 
The First Amendment right of silence includes the right not to listen to speech that a 
person wishes to avoid. This aspect of the right of silence enables a person to refuse to 
receive political, religious, or commercial solicitors calling on the person at home. The 
person can tell them to leave or post a no-solicitation sign, and if they insist on trying to 
communicate with the person after they have been told to leave, they can be prosecuted 
for trespass. 
 
Similarly, the government can protect the right to avoid unwanted communications by 
establishing a system by which persons can in advance indicate their unwillingness to 
receive certain kinds of communications and prohibit senders from sending such 
communications, such as by a do not call list.  
 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT OF SILENCE 
 
By Robert A. Sedler 
Distinguished Professor of Law 
Wayne State University 
 
 In a number of respects, the First Amendment recognizes that the values 
embodied in the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and freedom of 
association mandate a right of silence. Thus, in answer to the question, “What 
does the law have to say about silence,” I would say that in a number of contexts, 
the law of the First Amendment1 protects the right of silence. In this paper, I will 
discuss five contexts in which the First Amendment protects the right of silence. 
 
 The right to refuse to disclose one’s beliefs and associations to the 
government 
 
 This aspect of the right of silence traces back to the 1950's and 
1960's,when Congressional and state legislative committees tried to question 
witnesses about their membership in the Communist Party and other allegedly 
“subversive” organizations - the classic question was “Are you now or have you 
ever been a member of the Communist Party?” - and when governmental bodies 
in the southern states tried to identify members of the N.A.A.C.P. and other civil 
rights organizations. After some fits and starts, the Supreme Court in the early 
1960's made it clear that people were entitled to refuse to answer questions 
about their organizational membership and about their beliefs and associations 
unless the government could demonstrate a compelling interest in obtaining that 
information, which it could not do. Specifically the Court held that a governmental 
body investigating subversion could not require witnesses to testify as to their 
past membership in allegedly “subversive” organizations, 2 nor could it require an 
organization such as the N.A.A.C.P. to turn over its membership list to the 
investigating committee.3 A school board could not require that teachers list all 
the organizations to which they belonged or had contributed money for the 
preceding five years,4 nor could the state require that applicants for admission to 
                                                 
 1 The law of the First Amendment refers to those concepts, principles, 
specific doctrines and precedents that the Supreme Court has developed over 
the years in the process of deciding First Amendment case. See generally, 
Robert A. Sedler, The First Amendment in Litigation: The “ Law of the First 
Amendment,” 48 Washington and Lee Law Review 457 (1991). 
 2 DeGregory v. Attorney-General of New Hampshire, 383 U.S. 825 (1966). 
 3 Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U.S. 539 
(1963). 
 4 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). 
the practice of law disclose their political beliefs and organizational 
memberships.5 And while the First Amendment allows the government to require 
that political contributors report their contributions to or expenditures on behalf of 
a candidate, and to requirethat campaign committees report a list of their 
contributors,6 such a requirement could not constitutionally be applied to a minor 
political party, where the party showed a reasonable probability that such 
disclosure would subject the contributors to threats, harassment and reprisals 
from government officials and private persons.7 
 
 As a result of these decisions, it is clear that the First Amendment fully 
protects the right to refuse to disclose one’s beliefs and associations to the 
government. In the face of the government’s demands that a person disclose 
one’s beliefs and associations, the person can reply, “I choose to be silent.” 
 
 The right to speak anonymously 
 
 The First Amendment protects the right to speak anonymously. This right 
is an admixture of the right to speak and the right of silence. The speaker speaks 
the message, but is entitled to shield the speaker’s identity while speaking the 
message. Recognition of this right reflects the fact that in the United States, there 
has been a long tradition of anonymity in the advocacy of political causes.8 This 
tradition of anonymity advances the core purposes of the First Amendment, since 
it ensures that people will not be deterred from speaking for fear or reprisal by 
the government or by other people. It must be remembered that the core 
purposes of the First Amendment focus more on the right of the listener to 
receive information and ideas to the listener than on the right of the speaker to 
convey the information and ideas.  The preservation of the speaker’s anonymity 
enhances these core purposes by increasing the flow of information and ideas to 
the public. 
 
                                                 
 5 Law Students Civil Rights Research Council,Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 
154 (1971); Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1 (1971). The most that the 
state could do was to make an inquiry into an applicant’s “knowing membership 
in an illegal organization with the intent to further the organization’s illegal 
purpose” in order to determine the applicant’s “character and fitness” to practice 
law. 
 6 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 7 Brown v. Socialist Workers ‘74 Campaign Committee, 459 U.S. 87 
(1982). 
 8 See the discussion in Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York v. 
Village of Stratton, infra, note 12 at 166-167. 
 Because the First Amendment protects the right to speak anonymously, it 
is unconstitutional for the government to prohibit the dissemination of handbills 
that do not contain the names and addresses of the persons who prepared and 
disseminated the handbills.9 It is likewise unconstitutional for the government to 
require such information in connection with the distribution of literature in political 
campaigns.10 
 
 The Supreme Court has gone further in protecting the right to speak 
anonymously. It has held unconstitutional a state law that required the paid 
solicitors gathering signatures for a ballot initiative to wear name tags and to 
report their income from gathering signatures for the initiative.11  And it has also 
held unconstitutional a local law requiring persons to obtain a permit prior to 
engaging in door-to-door advocacy and to display on demand the permit 
containing that person’s name. The law was unconstitutional even though local 
officials were required to issue the permit, since the permit requirement could 
discourage anonymous advocacy, and the permit requirement was not narrowly 
tailored to advance the asserted governmental interests in protecting 
householder privacy and preventing fraud and crime.12 
 
 As the results in these cases demonstrate, in the American constitutional 
system the right of silence includes the right to speak anonymously and to 
express ideas while keeping secret the identity of the speaker. 
 
 The right not to be compelled to speak the government’s message 
 
 “If there is any star fixed in our constitutional constellation, it is that no 
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, 
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion, or force citizens to confess by 
word of act their faith therein.”13 This ringing declaration of the right not to be 
compelled to speak the government’s message was made by United States 
Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson in 1943, when in the midst of World 
War II, a West Virginia school board expelled a Jehovah’s Witness student for 
refusing to salute the American flag. While to most Americans saluting the flag 
represented the highest form of patriotism, to Jehovah’s Witnesses it represented 
a violation of the biblical command, “thou shall not bow down to g raven images. 
                                                 
 9 Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960). 
 10 McIntyre v. Ohio Election Commission, 514 U.S. 334 (1995). 
 11 Buckley v. Secretary of State of Colorado, 525 U.S. 182 (1999). 
 12 Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York v. Village of Stratton, 
536 U.S. 150 (2002). 
 13 West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,   (1943). 
“ In this case, the Court held that the First Amendment precluded the government 
from forcing citizens to “confess their patriotism” by saluting the American flag. 
As a result of this decision, whenever a school board requires a recitation of the 
pledge of allegiance or any other declaration of belief, it must excuse objecting 
students from the requirements 
 
 Some thirty years later, a Jehovah’s Witness couple again refused to 
speak the government’s message, here by covering up the New Hampshire state 
motto on their automobile license plate. The New Hampshire state motto, “live 
free or die,” traced back to a 1794 reunion of the state’s Revolutionary War 
militia, when its commander, well into his cups, cried out, “live free or die.” To 
Jehovah’s Witnesses, the notion of “live free or die,” was inconsistent with their 
beliefs in eternal life, so the Maynards covered up that portion of the license plate 
containing the motto. The local prosecutor insisted on prosecuting them for not 
properly displaying the license plate, and their case reached the Supreme Court. 
Relying on the 1943 flag salute decision, the Court held that the state could not 
require the Maynards to be a “mobile billboard” for the state’s ideological 
message. Such a requirement, said the Court, “invades the sphere of intellect 
and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to reserve from all 
official control.” 
 
 During the cold war era, states were concerned about allegedly “disloyal” 
and “subversive”  teachers in the public schools and universities, and in an effort 
to “root out” such teachers, imposed the requirement that they take a “loyalty 
oath.” These “loyalty oaths” typically required the teacher to swear that he or she 
did not belong to any “subversive” organizations and did not “advocate violent 
overthrow of the government.” Because these “loyalty oaths” required teachers 
and government employees to swear that they did not hold certain beliefs or 
belong to certain organizations, they “invaded the sphere of intellect and 
spirit,”and so violated the First Amendment.14 All that the government can require 
is that its employees take an affirmative oath to support the constitutional system 
of government.15 
 
 The right not to be associated with particular ideas 
 
 The guarantee of freedom of speech means that a person is entitled to 
speak his or her own ideas and cannot forced to be associated with a particular 
idea with which that person disagrees. The right not to be associated with 
                                                 
 14 Keyishian v. Board of Regents of State University of New York, 385 
U.S. 589 (1967); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Cramp v. Board of 
Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961). 
 15 Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676 (1972). Most loyalty oath 
requirements were held unconstitutional because they were not limited to 
affirmative oaths. 
particular ideas arises in two  contexts. First, since money is considered “speech” 
for First Amendment purposes,16 the government cannot compel a person to pay 
money to support the expression of an idea with which that person disagrees. In 
Michigan and in a number of other states, there is what is called an “integrated 
bar,” which requires that all lawyers belong to and pay dues to a state bar 
association. To a large extent, the compulsory dues are used to support the 
activities of the state bar association, and all lawyers are considered to benefit 
from those activities. But sometimes the state bar association takes positions on 
ideological issues, such as supporting a woman’s right to choose to have an 
abortion. When the bar association uses the compulsory dues to support 
ideological positions, it is violating the rights of its members who oppose that 
position, such as members who are opposed to abortion. The First Amendment, 
therefore, requires that objecting lawyers are entitled to a pro rata refund of that 
portion of the compulsory dues that are used by the bar association for 
ideological purposes.17 Likewise, when governmental employees are represented 
by a union under an “agency shop” arrangement that requires non-union 
members of the bargaining to pay the equivalent of union dues by means of an 
agency fee, the union may not use any portion of the agency fee to advance 
ideological purposes unrelated to the union’s function as collective bargaining 
representative.18 
 
 Second, there is the right not to be compelled to share one’s own speech 
with opposing speech and  in effect to provide a forum for that opposing speech. 
                                                 
 16 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 17 Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1 (1990). 
 18 Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
 
    An interesting application of the principle that the government cannot 
compel a person to pay money to support the expression of an idea with which 
that person disagrees involved two federally-authorized agricultural marketing 
associations. In one case the Court held that the First Amendment was not 
violated by governmentally-authorized assessments for generic advertising 
imposed on members of an association of agricultural producers, because the 
generic advertising did not promote any particular message, but merely urged 
consumers to purchase the agricultural products. Glikckman v. Wileman Brothers 
& Elliot,Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997). But in another case the Court held that the 
First Amendment was violated by a mushroom marketing scheme under which a 
federally-established mushroom association imposed mandatory assessments 
on handlers of fresh mushrooms for generic advertising to promote mushroom 
sales. Here the Court concluded that the assessment was not germane to a 
purpose of the association independent of the speech itself and so compelled 
support only for speech. United States Department of Agriculture v. United 
Foods,Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001). 
In one case involving this right a public utility had been including in its monthly 
billing statement additional materials expressing the utility’s views on energy 
issues and conservation. A consumer group had urged the state regulatory 
commission to prohibit the utility from including the additional materials in the 
billing statement. Instead the commission ordered the utility to allow the 
consumer group to include the group’s own materials in the billing statement four 
times a year. The materials would be identified as expressing the views of the 
consumer group and not those of the utility. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court 
held that this requirement violated the utility’s First Amendment rights because it 
forced the utility to provide a forum for views other than its own.19 
 
 In another case, the Court struck down a state “right of reply law,” which 
required a newspaper to give a right of reply in the newspaper to a political 
candidate that it had attacked in print. The Court based its decision on the fact 
that such a requirement could have a “chilling effect” on the newspaper’s 
willingness to attack political candidates.20 However, the result here is supportive 
of the right not to be associated with ideas with which a person disagrees, since 
the effect of the law would be to force the newspaper to provide a forum for the 
political candidate to reply to the newspaper’s attack on the candidate. 
 
 A third case involved the efforts of an Irish-American gay, lesbian and 
bisexual group to march in a St. Patrick’s Day parade sponsored by an Irish-
American Veterans group. The parade was licensed by the City of Boston, and a 
main street was blocked off for the parade. The sponsor allowed a number of 
Irish-American groups to march in the parade, but refused to allow the gay, 
lesbian, and bisexual group to do so. That group wanted to march in the parade 
under its own banner to convey the message that its members had pride in being 
both Irish-American and being gay, lesbian and bisexual. The state court held 
that under state law, the parade was a “place of public accommodation,” and that 
the sponsor could not exclude a group from marching in the parade because of 
its sexual orientation. The Supreme Court held that the application of the state 
public accommodations law to require the sponsor to include the gay, lesbian 
and bisexual group in the parade violate the sponsor’s First Amendment rights. 
The Court said that the sponsor was entitled to exclude a message that the 
sponsor did not like from the sponsor’s own communication, that the sponsor 
was entitled to chose the content of the message that its communication 
conveyed, and that permitting the gay, lesbian, and bisexual group to participate 
would alter the expressive content of the parade.21 
                                                 
 19 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 475 U.S. 1 
(1986). 
 
 20 Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
 21 Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 
515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
 
 At first glance, the decision may appear to be a defeat for the gay, lesbian, 
and bisexual group, but in retrospect it was a victory for the group. This is 
because under the First Amendment’s equal access principle, the group was 
entitled to have its own  parade and to have what the Supreme Court referred to 
as a “fair shot” to having it on the main street on St. Patrick’s day. When a city 
decides to open up the public streets to parades, it is required to provide to 
provide equal access to all groups and cannot give preference to any group 
based on the content of the message that the group wishes to parade. So, if the 
City of Boston was to open up the main street for a parade on St. Patrick’s Day, it 
was required to establish a content neutral licensing system by which any Irish-
American group, including  the Irish-American gay, lesbian and bisexual group, 
would have the opportunity to hold their own parade on St. Patrick’s Day. The 
city could not reserve the main street for a St. Patrick’s Day parade for any 
particular group. Thus, under the First Amendment, the Irish-American gay, 
lesbian, and bisexual group was entitled to have its own parade, in which it could 
convey its own message of Irish-American gay, lesbian and bisexual pride, and 
the Irish-American veterans group was entitled to have its own parade and to 
exclude an Irish-American gay, lesbian and bisexual group from that parade. 
 
 An important component of the First Amendment right of silence is the 
right of a speaker not to be forced to be associated with an idea with which the 
speaker disagrees. As these cases indicate, this right has been broadly 
interpreted by the Supreme Court and has been applied in a number of contexts. 
 
 The right to avoid unwanted communications 
 
 The First Amendment right of silence includes the right not to listen to 
speech that a person wishes to avoid. The right to avoid unwanted 
communications operates in three ways. First, it enables a person to refuse to 
receive political, religious, or commercial solicitors calling on the person at home. 
The person can tell them to leave or post a no-solicitation sign, and if they resists 
in trying to communicate with the person after they have been told to leave, they 
can be prosecuted for trespass. Second, precisely because a person has the 
right to avoid unwanted communications in that person’s home, state and 
municipal anti-solicitation laws cannot be justified on the ground that they are 
designed to protect householder privacy. As a result, they are likely to be found 
to be violative of the First Amendment.22 
                                                 
 22 See e.g., Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (Ordinance 
prohibiting ringing of doorbell or otherwise summoning resident to the door for 
purpose of receiving literature as  applied to distribution of religious literature); 
Hynes v. Mayor and Council of Oradel, 425 U.S. 610 (1976) (Ordinance requiring 
advance notice to police department by persons who want to canvas door-to-
door for charitable causes or political campaigns or causes); Watchtower Bible & 
Tract Society v. Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002) (Ordinance requiring door to door 
 
 Third, and most importantly, the government can protect the right to avoid 
unwanted communications by establishing a system by which persons can in 
advance indicate their unwillingness to receive certain kinds of communications 
and prohibit senders from sending such communications. Because the First 
Amendment includes the right to avoid unwanted communications, the 
establishment of such an “opt-out system” does not violate the First Amendment 
rights of those who wish to send the communications. The leading case 
recognizing this right is Rowan v. United States Post Office Department, 23where 
the Court upheld a federal law enabling persons to put themselves on a list that 
prevented mailers of sexually explicit material from sending that kind of material 
to them. The mailers were required to purchase the list, and they risked criminal 
prosecution for sending the material to persons on the list. In holding that the law 
did not violate the First Amendment rights of the mailers, the Court emphasized 
that the mailer’s right to communicate must stop at the mailbox of the unwilling 
addressee. 
 
 The recipient’s right to avoid unwanted communications is the basis for 
the court’s upholding the constitutionality of the national “do-not-call” registry, 
which allows individuals to register their phone numbers on a national “do-not-
call” list and prohibits most commercial mailers from calling the numbers on the 
list. This law has an “opt-in” feature that provides a mechanism for consumers to 
restrict commercial sales calls, and since commercial speech receives less 
constitutional protection than non-commercial speech, it does not matter that the 
law does not provide a similar mechanism to limit charitable or political calls.24 
For the same reason the courts have also upheld a number of state “do-not-call” 
laws that allow individuals to avoid some or all commercial and other 
solicitations.25 
                                                                                                                                                 
advocates or solicitors of literature to register with the mayor). In response to the 
argument that the ordinance was designed to protect the privacy of the resident, 
the Court observed that, “sec. 107 of the ordinance, which provides for the 
posting of ‘No solicitation’ signs, and which is not challenged in this case, 
coupled with the resident’s unquestioned right to refuse to engage in 
conversation with unwelcome visitors, provides ample protection for the unwilling 
listener.” 536 U.S. at 168. 
 23 397 U.S. 728 (1970). 
 24 See e.g., Mainstream Marketing Services,Inc. v. Federal 
Communications Commission, 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 25 See e.g., National Coalition of Prayer,Inc. v. Carter, 455 F.3d 783 (7th 
Cir. 2006); National Federation of the Blind of Arkansas, Inc. v. Pryor, 258 F.3d 
851 (8th Cir. 2001); National Federation of the Blind v. Federal Trade 
Commission, 420 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 2005); Fraternal Order of Police, North 
Dakota State Lodge v. Stenehjem, 431 F.3d 591 (8th Cir. 2005). 
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 In a number of respects, the First Amendment recognizes that the values 
embodied in the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and freedom of 
association mandate a right of silence. Thus, in answer to the question, “What 
does the law have to say about silence,” I would say that in a number of contexts, 
the law of the First Amendment1 protects the right of silence. In this paper, I will 
discuss five contexts in which the First Amendment protects the right of silence. 
 
 The right to refuse to disclose one’s beliefs and associations to the 
government 
 
 This aspect of the right of silence traces back to the 1950's and 
1960's,when Congressional and state legislative committees tried to question 
witnesses about their membership in the Communist Party and other allegedly 
“subversive” organizations - the classic question was “Are you now or have you 
ever been a member of the Communist Party?” - and when governmental bodies 
in the southern states tried to identify members of the N.A.A.C.P. and other civil 
rights organizations. After some fits and starts, the Supreme Court in the early 
1960's made it clear that people were entitled to refuse to answer questions 
about their organizational membership and about their beliefs and associations 
unless the government could demonstrate a compelling interest in obtaining that 
information, which it could not do. Specifically the Court held that a governmental 
body investigating subversion could not require witnesses to testify as to their 
past membership in allegedly “subversive” organizations, 2 nor could it require an 
organization such as the N.A.A.C.P. to turn over its membership list to the 
investigating committee.3 A school board could not require that teachers list all 
the organizations to which they belonged or had contributed money for the 
preceding five years,4 nor could the state require that applicants for admission to 
                                                 
 1 The law of the First Amendment refers to those concepts, principles, 
specific doctrines and precedents that the Supreme Court has developed over 
the years in the process of deciding First Amendment case. See generally, 
Robert A. Sedler, The First Amendment in Litigation: The “ Law of the First 
Amendment,” 48 Washington and Lee Law Review 457 (1991). 
 2 DeGregory v. Attorney-General of New Hampshire, 383 U.S. 825 (1966). 
 3 Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U.S. 539 
(1963). 
 4 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). 
the practice of law disclose their political beliefs and organizational 
memberships.5 And while the First Amendment allows the government to require 
that political contributors report their contributions to or expenditures on behalf of 
a candidate, and to requirethat campaign committees report a list of their 
contributors,6 such a requirement could not constitutionally be applied to a minor 
political party, where the party showed a reasonable probability that such 
disclosure would subject the contributors to threats, harassment and reprisals 
from government officials and private persons.7 
 
 As a result of these decisions, it is clear that the First Amendment fully 
protects the right to refuse to disclose one’s beliefs and associations to the 
government. In the face of the government’s demands that a person disclose 
one’s beliefs and associations, the person can reply, “I choose to be silent.” 
 
 The right to speak anonymously 
 
 The First Amendment protects the right to speak anonymously. This right 
is an admixture of the right to speak and the right of silence. The speaker speaks 
the message, but is entitled to shield the speaker’s identity while speaking the 
message. Recognition of this right reflects the fact that in the United States, there 
has been a long tradition of anonymity in the advocacy of political causes.8 This 
tradition of anonymity advances the core purposes of the First Amendment, since 
it ensures that people will not be deterred from speaking for fear or reprisal by 
the government or by other people. It must be remembered that the core 
purposes of the First Amendment focus more on the right of the listener to 
receive information and ideas to the listener than on the right of the speaker to 
convey the information and ideas.  The preservation of the speaker’s anonymity 
enhances these core purposes by increasing the flow of information and ideas to 
the public. 
 
                                                 
 5 Law Students Civil Rights Research Council,Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 
154 (1971); Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1 (1971). The most that the 
state could do was to make an inquiry into an applicant’s “knowing membership 
in an illegal organization with the intent to further the organization’s illegal 
purpose” in order to determine the applicant’s “character and fitness” to practice 
law. 
 6 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 7 Brown v. Socialist Workers ‘74 Campaign Committee, 459 U.S. 87 
(1982). 
 8 See the discussion in Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York v. 
Village of Stratton, infra, note 12 at 166-167. 
 Because the First Amendment protects the right to speak anonymously, it 
is unconstitutional for the government to prohibit the dissemination of handbills 
that do not contain the names and addresses of the persons who prepared and 
disseminated the handbills.9 It is likewise unconstitutional for the government to 
require such information in connection with the distribution of literature in political 
campaigns.10 
 
 The Supreme Court has gone further in protecting the right to speak 
anonymously. It has held unconstitutional a state law that required the paid 
solicitors gathering signatures for a ballot initiative to wear name tags and to 
report their income from gathering signatures for the initiative.11  And it has also 
held unconstitutional a local law requiring persons to obtain a permit prior to 
engaging in door-to-door advocacy and to display on demand the permit 
containing that person’s name. The law was unconstitutional even though local 
officials were required to issue the permit, since the permit requirement could 
discourage anonymous advocacy, and the permit requirement was not narrowly 
tailored to advance the asserted governmental interests in protecting 
householder privacy and preventing fraud and crime.12 
 
 As the results in these cases demonstrate, in the American constitutional 
system the right of silence includes the right to speak anonymously and to 
express ideas while keeping secret the identity of the speaker. 
 
 The right not to be compelled to speak the government’s message 
 
 “If there is any star fixed in our constitutional constellation, it is that no 
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, 
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion, or force citizens to confess by 
word of act their faith therein.”13 This ringing declaration of the right not to be 
compelled to speak the government’s message was made by United States 
Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson in 1943, when in the midst of World 
War II, a West Virginia school board expelled a Jehovah’s Witness student for 
refusing to salute the American flag. While to most Americans saluting the flag 
represented the highest form of patriotism, to Jehovah’s Witnesses it represented 
a violation of the biblical command, “thou shall not bow down to g raven images. 
                                                 
 9 Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960). 
 10 McIntyre v. Ohio Election Commission, 514 U.S. 334 (1995). 
 11 Buckley v. Secretary of State of Colorado, 525 U.S. 182 (1999). 
 12 Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York v. Village of Stratton, 
536 U.S. 150 (2002). 
 13 West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,   (1943). 
“ In this case, the Court held that the First Amendment precluded the government 
from forcing citizens to “confess their patriotism” by saluting the American flag. 
As a result of this decision, whenever a school board requires a recitation of the 
pledge of allegiance or any other declaration of belief, it must excuse objecting 
students from the requirements 
 
 Some thirty years later, a Jehovah’s Witness couple again refused to 
speak the government’s message, here by covering up the New Hampshire state 
motto on their automobile license plate. The New Hampshire state motto, “live 
free or die,” traced back to a 1794 reunion of the state’s Revolutionary War 
militia, when its commander, well into his cups, cried out, “live free or die.” To 
Jehovah’s Witnesses, the notion of “live free or die,” was inconsistent with their 
beliefs in eternal life, so the Maynards covered up that portion of the license plate 
containing the motto. The local prosecutor insisted on prosecuting them for not 
properly displaying the license plate, and their case reached the Supreme Court. 
Relying on the 1943 flag salute decision, the Court held that the state could not 
require the Maynards to be a “mobile billboard” for the state’s ideological 
message. Such a requirement, said the Court, “invades the sphere of intellect 
and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to reserve from all 
official control.” 
 
 During the cold war era, states were concerned about allegedly “disloyal” 
and “subversive”  teachers in the public schools and universities, and in an effort 
to “root out” such teachers, imposed the requirement that they take a “loyalty 
oath.” These “loyalty oaths” typically required the teacher to swear that he or she 
did not belong to any “subversive” organizations and did not “advocate violent 
overthrow of the government.” Because these “loyalty oaths” required teachers 
and government employees to swear that they did not hold certain beliefs or 
belong to certain organizations, they “invaded the sphere of intellect and 
spirit,”and so violated the First Amendment.14 All that the government can require 
is that its employees take an affirmative oath to support the constitutional system 
of government.15 
 
 The right not to be associated with particular ideas 
 
 The guarantee of freedom of speech means that a person is entitled to 
speak his or her own ideas and cannot forced to be associated with a particular 
idea with which that person disagrees. The right not to be associated with 
                                                 
 14 Keyishian v. Board of Regents of State University of New York, 385 
U.S. 589 (1967); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Cramp v. Board of 
Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961). 
 15 Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676 (1972). Most loyalty oath 
requirements were held unconstitutional because they were not limited to 
affirmative oaths. 
particular ideas arises in two  contexts. First, since money is considered “speech” 
for First Amendment purposes,16 the government cannot compel a person to pay 
money to support the expression of an idea with which that person disagrees. In 
Michigan and in a number of other states, there is what is called an “integrated 
bar,” which requires that all lawyers belong to and pay dues to a state bar 
association. To a large extent, the compulsory dues are used to support the 
activities of the state bar association, and all lawyers are considered to benefit 
from those activities. But sometimes the state bar association takes positions on 
ideological issues, such as supporting a woman’s right to choose to have an 
abortion. When the bar association uses the compulsory dues to support 
ideological positions, it is violating the rights of its members who oppose that 
position, such as members who are opposed to abortion. The First Amendment, 
therefore, requires that objecting lawyers are entitled to a pro rata refund of that 
portion of the compulsory dues that are used by the bar association for 
ideological purposes.17 Likewise, when governmental employees are represented 
by a union under an “agency shop” arrangement that requires non-union 
members of the bargaining to pay the equivalent of union dues by means of an 
agency fee, the union may not use any portion of the agency fee to advance 
ideological purposes unrelated to the union’s function as collective bargaining 
representative.18 
 
 Second, there is the right not to be compelled to share one’s own speech 
with opposing speech and  in effect to provide a forum for that opposing speech. 
                                                 
 16 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 17 Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1 (1990). 
 18 Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
 
    An interesting application of the principle that the government cannot 
compel a person to pay money to support the expression of an idea with which 
that person disagrees involved two federally-authorized agricultural marketing 
associations. In one case the Court held that the First Amendment was not 
violated by governmentally-authorized assessments for generic advertising 
imposed on members of an association of agricultural producers, because the 
generic advertising did not promote any particular message, but merely urged 
consumers to purchase the agricultural products. Glikckman v. Wileman Brothers 
& Elliot,Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997). But in another case the Court held that the 
First Amendment was violated by a mushroom marketing scheme under which a 
federally-established mushroom association imposed mandatory assessments 
on handlers of fresh mushrooms for generic advertising to promote mushroom 
sales. Here the Court concluded that the assessment was not germane to a 
purpose of the association independent of the speech itself and so compelled 
support only for speech. United States Department of Agriculture v. United 
Foods,Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001). 
In one case involving this right a public utility had been including in its monthly 
billing statement additional materials expressing the utility’s views on energy 
issues and conservation. A consumer group had urged the state regulatory 
commission to prohibit the utility from including the additional materials in the 
billing statement. Instead the commission ordered the utility to allow the 
consumer group to include the group’s own materials in the billing statement four 
times a year. The materials would be identified as expressing the views of the 
consumer group and not those of the utility. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court 
held that this requirement violated the utility’s First Amendment rights because it 
forced the utility to provide a forum for views other than its own.19 
 
 In another case, the Court struck down a state “right of reply law,” which 
required a newspaper to give a right of reply in the newspaper to a political 
candidate that it had attacked in print. The Court based its decision on the fact 
that such a requirement could have a “chilling effect” on the newspaper’s 
willingness to attack political candidates.20 However, the result here is supportive 
of the right not to be associated with ideas with which a person disagrees, since 
the effect of the law would be to force the newspaper to provide a forum for the 
political candidate to reply to the newspaper’s attack on the candidate. 
 
 A third case involved the efforts of an Irish-American gay, lesbian and 
bisexual group to march in a St. Patrick’s Day parade sponsored by an Irish-
American Veterans group. The parade was licensed by the City of Boston, and a 
main street was blocked off for the parade. The sponsor allowed a number of 
Irish-American groups to march in the parade, but refused to allow the gay, 
lesbian, and bisexual group to do so. That group wanted to march in the parade 
under its own banner to convey the message that its members had pride in being 
both Irish-American and being gay, lesbian and bisexual. The state court held 
that under state law, the parade was a “place of public accommodation,” and that 
the sponsor could not exclude a group from marching in the parade because of 
its sexual orientation. The Supreme Court held that the application of the state 
public accommodations law to require the sponsor to include the gay, lesbian 
and bisexual group in the parade violate the sponsor’s First Amendment rights. 
The Court said that the sponsor was entitled to exclude a message that the 
sponsor did not like from the sponsor’s own communication, that the sponsor 
was entitled to chose the content of the message that its communication 
conveyed, and that permitting the gay, lesbian, and bisexual group to participate 
would alter the expressive content of the parade.21 
                                                 
 19 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 475 U.S. 1 
(1986). 
 
 20 Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
 21 Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 
515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
 
 At first glance, the decision may appear to be a defeat for the gay, lesbian, 
and bisexual group, but in retrospect it was a victory for the group. This is 
because under the First Amendment’s equal access principle, the group was 
entitled to have its own  parade and to have what the Supreme Court referred to 
as a “fair shot” to having it on the main street on St. Patrick’s day. When a city 
decides to open up the public streets to parades, it is required to provide to 
provide equal access to all groups and cannot give preference to any group 
based on the content of the message that the group wishes to parade. So, if the 
City of Boston was to open up the main street for a parade on St. Patrick’s Day, it 
was required to establish a content neutral licensing system by which any Irish-
American group, including  the Irish-American gay, lesbian and bisexual group, 
would have the opportunity to hold their own parade on St. Patrick’s Day. The 
city could not reserve the main street for a St. Patrick’s Day parade for any 
particular group. Thus, under the First Amendment, the Irish-American gay, 
lesbian, and bisexual group was entitled to have its own parade, in which it could 
convey its own message of Irish-American gay, lesbian and bisexual pride, and 
the Irish-American veterans group was entitled to have its own parade and to 
exclude an Irish-American gay, lesbian and bisexual group from that parade. 
 
 An important component of the First Amendment right of silence is the 
right of a speaker not to be forced to be associated with an idea with which the 
speaker disagrees. As these cases indicate, this right has been broadly 
interpreted by the Supreme Court and has been applied in a number of contexts. 
 
 The right to avoid unwanted communications 
 
 The First Amendment right of silence includes the right not to listen to 
speech that a person wishes to avoid. The right to avoid unwanted 
communications operates in three ways. First, it enables a person to refuse to 
receive political, religious, or commercial solicitors calling on the person at home. 
The person can tell them to leave or post a no-solicitation sign, and if they resists 
in trying to communicate with the person after they have been told to leave, they 
can be prosecuted for trespass. Second, precisely because a person has the 
right to avoid unwanted communications in that person’s home, state and 
municipal anti-solicitation laws cannot be justified on the ground that they are 
designed to protect householder privacy. As a result, they are likely to be found 
to be violative of the First Amendment.22 
                                                 
 22 See e.g., Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (Ordinance 
prohibiting ringing of doorbell or otherwise summoning resident to the door for 
purpose of receiving literature as  applied to distribution of religious literature); 
Hynes v. Mayor and Council of Oradel, 425 U.S. 610 (1976) (Ordinance requiring 
advance notice to police department by persons who want to canvas door-to-
door for charitable causes or political campaigns or causes); Watchtower Bible & 
Tract Society v. Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002) (Ordinance requiring door to door 
 
 Third, and most importantly, the government can protect the right to avoid 
unwanted communications by establishing a system by which persons can in 
advance indicate their unwillingness to receive certain kinds of communications 
and prohibit senders from sending such communications. Because the First 
Amendment includes the right to avoid unwanted communications, the 
establishment of such an “opt-out system” does not violate the First Amendment 
rights of those who wish to send the communications. The leading case 
recognizing this right is Rowan v. United States Post Office Department, 23where 
the Court upheld a federal law enabling persons to put themselves on a list that 
prevented mailers of sexually explicit material from sending that kind of material 
to them. The mailers were required to purchase the list, and they risked criminal 
prosecution for sending the material to persons on the list. In holding that the law 
did not violate the First Amendment rights of the mailers, the Court emphasized 
that the mailer’s right to communicate must stop at the mailbox of the unwilling 
addressee. 
 
 The recipient’s right to avoid unwanted communications is the basis for 
the court’s upholding the constitutionality of the national “do-not-call” registry, 
which allows individuals to register their phone numbers on a national “do-not-
call” list and prohibits most commercial mailers from calling the numbers on the 
list. This law has an “opt-in” feature that provides a mechanism for consumers to 
restrict commercial sales calls, and since commercial speech receives less 
constitutional protection than non-commercial speech, it does not matter that the 
law does not provide a similar mechanism to limit charitable or political calls.24 
For the same reason the courts have also upheld a number of state “do-not-call” 
laws that allow individuals to avoid some or all commercial and other 
solicitations.25 
                                                                                                                                                 
advocates or solicitors of literature to register with the mayor). In response to the 
argument that the ordinance was designed to protect the privacy of the resident, 
the Court observed that, “sec. 107 of the ordinance, which provides for the 
posting of ‘No solicitation’ signs, and which is not challenged in this case, 
coupled with the resident’s unquestioned right to refuse to engage in 
conversation with unwelcome visitors, provides ample protection for the unwilling 
listener.” 536 U.S. at 168. 
 23 397 U.S. 728 (1970). 
 24 See e.g., Mainstream Marketing Services,Inc. v. Federal 
Communications Commission, 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 25 See e.g., National Coalition of Prayer,Inc. v. Carter, 455 F.3d 783 (7th 
Cir. 2006); National Federation of the Blind of Arkansas, Inc. v. Pryor, 258 F.3d 
851 (8th Cir. 2001); National Federation of the Blind v. Federal Trade 
Commission, 420 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 2005); Fraternal Order of Police, North 
Dakota State Lodge v. Stenehjem, 431 F.3d 591 (8th Cir. 2005). 
